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Georgia State University  
Introduction 
Belarus is the last command economy left standing in Europe. Because it still has an option of a 
gradual transition ("Chinese style'"), the study of Belarus’ case can present insights on the 
counterfactual to the "shock therapy" approach undertaken by the rest of the Central and Eastern 
European countries.  However, the viability of the existing system hinges on its ability to 
weather short-term external economic shocks and to adjust to a significant list of medium term 
structural challenges.  Now that more than half of Belarus’ consolidated public expenditures, 
excluding social security, takes place at the subnational levels of government, its ability to adjust 
largely hinges on the incentives that the system of intergovernmental relations presents to 
subnational officials. Belarus' experience with the recent recurrent macro-economic turmoil 
suggests that the incentives embedded in the system of intergovernmental fiscal transfers might 
hinder its ability to undergo fiscal adjustment and consolidation. Thus, since 2008, Belarus 
underwent one of the largest contractions in the size of government in the region, with public 
expenditures contracting by 12.9 percentage points of GDP and finally dropping to 37 percent of 
GDP at the end of 2011 (Figure 1).  
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Figure 1 Belarus Significantly Reduced the Size of the General Government Budget 
 




An important feature of the process is that a reduction of subsidies from the national budget 
to enterprises was partially offset by an increase in subsidies from subnational budgets. As a 
result, today subnational budgets account for two thirds of all subsidies to enterprises, compared 
to only one third in 2008. In addition, there are signs that the current system of 
intergovernmental fiscal relations might not provide the correct or even sufficient incentives to 
improve the efficiency of subnational government service delivery. This lack of efficiency might 
be interpreted as the necessary price to pay for the almost complete bridging of fiscal disparities   
among regions. Thus, while in per capita terms the City of Minsk has three times more locally-
derived revenues than the poorest region, after the allocation of intergovernmental transfers this 
gap narrows to only 18 percent. In a similar vein, while sub-region districts (similar to the U.S. 
counties) have 8 percent lower levels in locally-derived revenues per capita than the cities’ 
average, the districts end up with 40 percent more revenue per capita than the cities after the 
allocation of grants. As a result, sub-region districts spend more per capita on each function than 
the city average. Because, outside Minsk City,  two thirds of the population resides in sub-region 
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Belarus has made tangible progress in recent years in various aspects of its system of 
intergovernmental fiscal relations. In particular, by 2005 de facto expenditure responsibilities 
had been revised with the central government, appropriately, assuming a greater role in 
economic affairs and social policy. Later, the Ministry of Finance developed a formula-based 
methodology for the allocation of general-purpose grants, which is yet to be implemented. 
However, the current systems as it stands falls significantly short of the gains in public sector 
efficiency that can be realized from a well-structured system of intergovernmental fiscal 
relations. 
In this paper, we analyze how differences in per capita expenditures of different cities and 
different districts relate to the difference in incentives faced by local officials within the current 
system of intergovernmental fiscal relations. In particular, we examine the role of a list of 
potential determinants of per capita expenditures, including reliance on own-source revenues, 
economies of scale in terms of population and land area, and demographic trends among other 
factors. 
 
II. Institutional framework 
In Belarus, the territorial division of public administration is comprised of four tiers, 
including three subnational tiers (Figure 2). 
In Belarus, excessive fragmentation would not appear to be a concern except for the 
lowest tier of government (rural districts, rural settlements and towns of raion's subordination). 
As we can see in Table 1  the average size of the lowest tier jurisdictions is about 3,600, which is 
below the threshold of 10,000 for the efficient—or minimum cost—delivery of public services. 
Although there is information on the population of settlements, it was not possible to establish 
how these jurisdictions are bundled into political jurisdictions at the bottom tier. We suspect, 
however, as is the case in other countries, that there is considerable variation in the size of these 
jurisdictions and so not all of them are likely to have insufficient scale. In the next section, we 
provide some evidence of economies of scale in the provision of main functions by raion 
governments. 
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Figure 2. Diagram of the tiers of public administration 
 
Source: Prepared by authors based on data from  the National Statistical 
Committee of the Republic of Belarus and World Bank (2009) 
 
  Table 1. Population of subnational jurisdictions, persons, 2011 
 
Oblasts and 








 Raions Suboblast 
cities 
 
Number of units 7 118 12 1,357 
Mean 1,354,456 41,003 231,559 3,566 
Min 1,066,010 10,894 62,075 n/a 
Max 1,864,090 186,325 501,312 n/a 
Coefficient of 
Variation 
0.20 0.78 0.60 n/a 
Source: National Statistical Committee of the Republic of Belarus and World Bank (2009). 
Note: Figures for the top and bottom sub-oblast jurisdictions do not include population of 
the Minsk City 
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Table 2: Government Expenditure as % of GDP, 2007-10 
 
2007 2008 2009 2010 
 
CG LG CG LG CG LG CG LG 
Total 20.84 18.29 21.40 17.30 20.08 17.00 16.06 17.79 
General public services 2.14 1.22 2.03 1.08 2.42 1.06 2.03 1.17 
Defense 1.23 0.02 1.09 0.01 0.98 0.01 0.99 0.00 
Public order and safety 2.00 0.33 1.74 0.29 1.75 0.27 1.94 0.11 
National economy 9.59 2.44 11.24 2.13 9.14 2.36 5.68 2.32 
Environmental protection 0.55 0.00 0.37 0.06 0.20 0.10 0.14 0.16 
Housing and communal services 0.14 3.33 0.19 3.70 0.24 3.43 0.24 3.81 
Health 1.09 3.96 0.97 3.43 1.08 3.40 1.00 3.55 
Physical culture, sports, culture 
and media 0.86 1.04 0.85 1.12 0.92 1.02 0.58 1.09 
Education 1.67 4.86 1.49 4.42 1.51 4.30 1.54 4.51 
Social policy 1.57 1.08 1.44 1.05 1.85 1.05 1.93 1.07 
Source: IMF - Government Finance Statistics 
Note: CG. Central Government w/o Social Security Funds and transfers to subnational governments 
LG. Local Governments 
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In terms of the overall public sector, until recently, Belarus has had rather large general 
government expenditures, accounting for 45% of GDP in 2010, out of which 11.2% of GDP by 
social security funds. This puts Belarus among the high public expenditures or tax revenue ratios 
to GDP league of countries, many of which have considerable higher per capita income than 
Belarus. 
As the legal framework does not provide a clear assignment of functions, we look at the 
actual expenditures to gauge the relative roles of different tiers of subnational government. In 
2011, subnational budgets in Belarus accounted for 55.4% of general government expenditures 
excluding social security funds (up from 43.2% in 2009) and 39.3% of general government tax 
revenues excluding social security funds (up from 35.9% in 2009). The increase in the 
decentralization ratios have been mostly due to a reduction of central government expenditures 
on national economy and culture and an across the board increase of subnational expenditures 
other than on national economy and public order (Table 2). Local government expenditures saw 
only a one-year dip in 2009, while the central government expenditures (excluding social funds) 
have been contracting as a percentage of GDP throughout these years.  This might indicate that 
the fiscal consolidation achieved at the national level might be blocked at the subnational level.
1
 
In particular the share of subnational government in general government outlays on economic 
affairs increased from 16 percent in 2007 to 35 percent in 2010, mainly as a result of withdrawal 
of the national government from these activities. 
The prevailing legal framework largely delineates responsibilities around the current 
distribution of “social assets” (or facilities) rather than dividing functions with regard to policy, 
regulation and financing. With the exception of three functions that are exclusively assigned to 
the national government (defense, law enforcement and promotion of the national economy) 
subnational governments carry out important responsibilities in most core government 
                                                 
1
 For some other countries in the region, it was found that, unless proper incentives are embedded into the 
system, decentralization can interfere fiscal consolidation, especially elimination of residual subsides associated 
with price controls (e.g., Timofeev 2001). This is because, in multi-tier governments, subnational levels tend to be 
more sensitive to “social” and “political” aspects of these reforms due their proximity to the constituency.  





 However, for many functions, the Budget Code assigns the responsibility for funding 
service facilities to a certain level of government based on the ownership of these facilities. For 
example, the Budget Code states that local governments are responsible for maintaining 
institutions of education, healthcare, social services and others that are owned by or put under 
authority of local governments. As a result, the division of responsibilities for many of the core 
functions between the levels of government is determined according to the obsolete framework 
of what is the current distribution of “social assets” (or infrastructure) between the levels of 
government. Thus, even though the Budget Code may provide clarity about what level is 
responsible for financing certain facilities, it is less clear what level of government is responsible 
for promulgating policies and regulations with regard to particular functions and services. In 
practice, it appears that across most functions, responsibilities are shared between different levels 
of Government with the central Government exercising important policy and regulatory 
functions, while subnational governments are responsible for running service delivery facilities 
Outside Minsk City, over two-thirds of subnational expenditures takes place at the sub-oblast 
level (Table 3). In particular, oblast governments proper account for less than a fifth of 
subnational expenditures on education and housing and utilities. The bulk of the key subnational 
expenditures takes place at the sub-oblast level.
3
 However, oblast governments dominate other 
categories of expenditures;   in particular they account for eighty percent of oblast-local 
expenditures on the national economy. 
  
                                                 
2
 Articles 44-47 of the Budget Code (adopted on July 16, 2008) provide the assignments of expenditure 
responsibilities among the levels of government. For the oblast level there are only a few exclusive assignments: 
rescue diving, territorial defense, management of land resources, and inter-city transport. For the city/raion level the 
exclusive assignments are: city transit, subsidization of fuel wood and coal, subsidization of utilities, public housing 
and saunas, ambulances, child day centers and foster care. 
3
 This is quite typical for the “Russian matryoshka-doll” type of hierarchical structure inherited by many 
countries in the region from the Soviet past. In that system, all the “outer dolls” are typically quite hollow, mostly 
playing the liaison role between the center and the bottom tier, with the latter being responsible for the delivery of 
most public services.  
8 International Center for Public Policy Working Paper Series 








100% 36% 64% 
Total expenditures 32% 20% 47% 
Housing and utilities 17% 28% 56% 
Healthcare 29% 28% 43% 
Recreation and culture 40% 13% 47% 
Education 15% 23% 62% 
Other expenditures 65% 8% 27% 
Source: Prepared by the authors based on Ministry of Finance data 
Note: These figures do not include Minsk City 
 
Subnational expenditures are predominantly financed by shared revenues from national taxes and 
other transfers. Shared revenue from national taxes is the largest financing item, contributing 
roughly 60 percent of sub-national revenues (Figure 3). Transfers from the central government, 
including both general-purpose and earmarked grants, make up another 35 percent. The 
remaining 5 percent comes from own-source tax and non-tax revenues. 
 


























Note: Minsk City is included in the consolidated and oblast figures but not in the city and raion figures 
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As can be seen from Figure 3, intergovernmental transfers, excluding redistribution of the 
VAT revenue, accounted for about 35% of subnational revenues in 2011 (up from 27% in 2009). 
The bulk of the national grants to oblasts (over 75 percent) is accounted for by gap-filling 
subsidies (general purpose transfers) and another 11 percent by capital grants (figure 4).   The 
rest were subventions earmarked for the mitigation of the effects from the Chernobyl accident, 
support to agriculture, housing vouchers, and so on. In the transfers from oblasts to cities and 
raions, the largest share is again accounted for by subsidies (79%). The major difference from 
the composition of national grants is that, in the oblast grant to localities, the shares of capital 
grants and subventions are much smaller (under 5 percent each), while 14% is accounted for by 
“other” transfers. This latter category is likely to include ad hoc gap-filling transfers that used to 
be called “mutual settlements” in the past. This suggests that cities and raions operate under 
softer budget constraints than oblast governments.  
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Figure 4. Composition of intergovernmental revenue,  2011 
Oblasts Cities and Raions 
 
 
Source: Calculated by the authors based on Ministry of Finance data. 
Note: Minsk City is included in the oblast figures but not in the city and raion figures 
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As is evident from Figure 5, transfers from the central government achieve a remarkable 
degree of equity in fiscal outcomes, with the richest region (Minsk city) spending only 18 
percent more per capita than the poorest region (Brest oblast).  The lowest variation is observed 
for education expenditures (coefficient of variation 0.08) and the highest variation is observed 
for recreation and culture (coefficient of variation 0.28).  
 
Figure 5. Disparity in fiscal outcomes, per capita expenditures in BYR, 2011 
 
Source: Prepared by the authors based on Ministry of Finance data 
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At the sub-oblast level, fiscal outcomes also appear quite equitable within the both groups of 
raions and sub-oblast cities (Table 4). Thus, the five-fold difference between the poorest and the 
richest raions in locally-derived revenues per person is reduced to four-fold after the per capita 
allocation of the VAT grants and to two-fold after the allocation of subsidies. However, transfers 
from the oblast budgets seem to over-equalize the difference between these two groups of local 
governments: cities and raions. While the per capita average of locally-derived revenues in 
raions is eight percent lower than the city average, raions end up with 40 percent more revenue 
per capita than the cities after the allocation of grants. 
Table 4. Equalization impact of transfers, by type of LSG, BYR per capita, 2011 
Type of jurisdictions Locally derived 
revenues 
plus VAT plus grants 
Raions 
Average 1,230 1,568 3,644 
Minimum 557 900 2,352 
Maximum 2,998 3,243 5,441 
Coef. of Variation 0.31 0.24 0.19 
    
Sub-oblast cities 
Average 1,329 1,679 2,572 
Minimum 762 1,175 2,080 
Maximum 1,768 2,218 3,153 
Coef. of Variation 0.25 0.19 0.12 
    
Source: Prepared by the authors based on Ministry of Finance data 
 
Note: These figures do not include Minsk City 
 
In addition to gap-filling transfers, incentives to rationalize expenditures are further 
affected by subnational governments’ access to explicit and implicit borrowing. Subnational 
liabilities have increased rapidly over the past few years, although exposure varies across 
localities. Sub-national liabilities, including both explicit debt and contingent liabilities, peaked 
at close to 14 percent of GDP in 2010 (Figure 6). High inflation in 2010/11 brought down the 
debt stock to 10 percent of GDP by the end of 2011—still about double its 2007 level. As of 
2011, three oblasts – Grodno, Mogilev and Brest – and 17 raions exceed the statutory limit 
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recently set in the Budget Code for debt and guaranteed debt (which should not exceed 80 
percent of pre-subventions revenue). 
Figure 6. Many subnational governments exceed debt limits 
 
3.0%









































Several other institutional issues are relevant to an overall assessment of expenditure 
efficiency at the subnational level. First, the delineation of authority between the tiers of 
government is rather murky. This is because two parallel hierarchical structures of subnational 
government are superimposed over the four tiers of territorial division:  1) the system of self-
local government; 2) the system of local government. The system of self-local government, 
comprised of local councils and neighborhood associations, is to “autonomously manage local 
affairs based on the national interests.” The system of local government, comprised of local 
executive bodies, is to “manage local affairs based on the national interests.” These two parallel 
systems are interlinked via numerous channels of vertical and horizontal subordination, 
resembling the system of dual subordination that was characteristic for countries like the Soviet 
Union and Egypt. Thus higher-level councils can annul acts of lower level councils while higher-
level executives can annul resolutions of lower level executives. Local councils affirm 
appointments by the President of executive heads at the same level of government. The Council 
Chair at the primary (bottom) tier also serves as the executive head at that tier. On the issues of 
local affairs, local executives report to the corresponding local councils. On the issues of national 
affairs, local executives report to the President and higher-level executives. Local line 
departments report to both the corresponding local executive head and higher-level sectoral 
heads. Local executive heads have to obtain no objection from a higher-level line-department in 
order to appoint the local sectoral head. At the same time local executive heads are asked for no 
objection to the appointment of heads of territorial branches of national agencies (tax service, 
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police, military recruitment centers, etc.) and state-owned enterprises. Under these arrangements, 
subnational budgets are drafted by the centrally appointed executives and then adopted by 
locally-elected councils.  
In addition, during the budget planning process, the allocation of transfers still remains 
primarily based on negotiations over the justifiable expenditures and expected revenues. 
Currently, the higher level government makes its own estimates for the revenues and 
expenditures of constituent jurisdictions. The top-down estimates of core (“protected”) 
expenditure are based on the actual staff and enrollments reported by each local government in 
the past.  Non-core expenditures are projected incrementally based on the past expenditures. This 
undermines incentives for local governments to save by having a more efficient use of resources.  
According to subnational government officials, this system does not discourage reallocating 
resources in the course of the fiscal year as long as the savings are utilized within the same fiscal 
year. The top-down expenditure estimates (“control figures”) will not be cut next year as long as,  
for every redundant position eliminated in one institution, a new position is created in another 
institution so that the total number of reported staff does not fall at the end of the year. This 
might hold in a static environment.  However, quite clearly, if different categories of 
expenditures (e.g. “protected” versus “unprotected”) are expanded and sequestered to different 
extents, this can provide disincentives to reallocate resources from inefficient “protected” items 
to “unprotected” items, which can be cut in the future.  
Parsing out expenditure disparities: objective expenditure needs versus inefficiency 
While the gap-filling allocation of intergovernmental grants results in almost complete bridging 
of disparities in per capita expenditures among regions, at the sub-regional level it results in 
over-equalization. Thus, per capita spending in raions is on average about 38 percent above per 
capita spending in cities (Figure 7). While there can be objectively higher per capita costs in 
rural areas due to lower population density and lack of economies of scale, high expenditures 
could be also due to the lack of spending adjustment to demographic changes, resulting in an 
oversized and underutilized rural service infrastructure. 
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Note: These figures do not include Minsk City 
According to Table 5 the disparity in per capita spending on various functions is smaller 
among the cities and among the raions than between the averages of these two groups. The 
smallest disparity is observed in education, where the average variation among the cities is only 
six percent of the mean and 16 percent for the variation among raions. At the same time, the 
raion average in education is 64 percent higher than the city average. Scatterplots in Figure 8, 
suggest the presence of economies of scale in the main functions of raion governments, although 
this is somewhat less pronounced for housing and utilities. Lower per capita expenditures by 
cities on some functions can also be due to the fact that oblast-government service facilities, like 
vocational schools, are primarily located in cities and thus might cover some of the service needs 
of urban residents that would need to be covered by raion governments in rural areas. 
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Average 3,451 690 626 246 1,359 530 
Minimum 2,214 314 0 87 845 243 
Maximum 5,177 1,321 956 588 2,218 1,142 
Coef. of 
Variation 0.18 0.36 0.34 0.32 0.16 0.36 
       
Sub-oblast cities 
Average 2,500 576 752 110 829 234 
Minimum 2,105 311 535 46 740 178 
Maximum 3,101 894 1,071 170 906 279 
Coef. of 
Variation 0.12 0.27 0.25 0.35 0.06 0.14 
       
Source: Prepared by the authors based on Ministry of Finance data 
Note: These figures do not include Minsk City 
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Figure 8. Economies of scale in raion expenditures, BYR per capita  2011 
  
  
Source: Prepared by the authors based on Ministry of Finance data. 
Note: These figures do not include Minsk City 
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One can argue that, to eliminate the disincentives of gap-filling transfers, every oblast should 
introduce a formula-driven system of equalization grants to municipalities. To assist oblast 
governments in developing such a formula for allocating grants to cities and raions, the Ministry 
of Finance could perform statistical estimations of elasticities of per client costs with respect to 
various cost factors on the sample pooling together cities and raions from all oblasts. The 
resulting estimates could be provided to the oblast governments as part of the budget circular 
along with other budget parameters serving as inputs to their budget planning process. We 
illustrate this approach by providing our estimates for the elasiticity of raion expenditures on 
main functions (Table 6). Thus, in the last column, the estimated coefficients quantify the exact 
impact of economies of scale on per capita spending in different sectors. Thus, according to the 
estimated elasticity of education costs, doubling the population while keeping constant its 
demographic structure appears to reduce per capita costs of education by 13 percent. In other 
words, when population increases by 100 percent, total costs increase only by 74 percent. 
Table 6. Elasticity of per capita expenditures of raions on main functions 


















insignificant -0.03 -0.21 
Housing and 
utilities -1.30 -1.23 
Statistically 
insignificant -0.16 -0.38 








insignificant 0.11 -0.24 
Education 
Statistically 





insignificant 0.15 -0.30 
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Because this kind of analysis is based on statistical averaging, it assumes that the identified 
general pattern reflects the objective impact of socio-economic characteristics on unit costs while 
all subjective and idiosyncratic factors represent deviations from this general pattern and are 
captured in the residuals of the regression equation so that on average positive deviations are 
offset by negative deviations. However, such an assumption of symmetric deviations does not 
agree well with the fact that, at the lower bound, costs are bound by the efficiency frontier while 
nothing but the total resource envelope constrains costs from above. Second, the statistical 
pattern revealed by actual expenditures does not necessarily reflect objective expenditure needs. 
Thus, higher per capita expenses in densely populated areas can reflect not only higher costs for 
equal level of per capita services but also higher levels of funding and spending—that is, more 
and/or better quality services— per capita (Table 6).  Thus, lower per capita expenditures on 
healthcare and communal amenities in low density districts are more likely to reflect historic 
under-provision of these services in rural areas.  
All of the aforementioned concerns can be empirically addressed by cost frontier modeling.  
Traditionally, expenditure needs have been estimated by passing the cost function through the 
middle of a cloud of historical expenditure data.
4
 This is generally consistent with the earlier 
studies of production and cost functions in the private sector activities, looking at average or 
“best-practice” technologies. Fortunately, this approach allows one to consistently estimate cost 
elasticities (i.e., substitution and economies of scale) but not the constant term.
5
 This is because 
the main difference from the efficiency frontier method is in the assumptions about the 
distribution of the deviations. But the ordinary least squares (OLS) method is robust to 
                                                 
4
 Thus, the Representative Expenditure System (RES) proposed for the United States by Robert Rafuse, then 
Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations, utilized the estimation of a 
translog cost function performed by Ladd and Yinger (1989) for a sample 86 largest cities. 
5
 This is because the constant term captures the shift of the sample average from the efficiency frontier. 
Therefore, despite displacement of the constant term, the OLS estimation allows comparing the degree of 
slack/inefficiency between local governments but not relative to the ideal cost frontier.   However, because OLS is 
robust to non-normality only asymptotically, it will have finite sample bias when the number of local governments is 
not large enough. In Belarus, with its 118 districts, finite sample bias is less of a concern. 
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nonnormality of that distribution when the sample is large enough (Greene 2008, p. 104). 
However, under the stochastic frontier approach these elasticities can be estimated more 
efficiently (i.e. with smaller margins of error) as the maximum likelihood (ML) estimator takes 
into account additional information about the shape of the distribution of the deviations. Not only 
would this allow for a more accurate estimation of contributions of different local characteristics 
to the expenditure needs, it would also prevent discarding some cost factors as statistically 
insignificant due to larger standard errors (i.e. smaller significance levels) produced by OLS. 
On the other hand, an advantage of the OLS approach is that it is easier to be comprehended 
by policy practitioners and to be sold to their constituents as fair and objective.  Another issue 
related to simplicity is the choice of the functional form: Cobb-Douglas versus translog. While 
the efficiency frontier studies have been increasingly dominated by a more flexible translog 
form, expenditure needs studies have been mostly using the Cobb-Douglas specification.  
Finally, in addition to differences in the costs of inputs, such as wages and the price of 
utilities, the efficiency frontier modeling also allows to control for other objective factors leading 
to disparities in expenditures needs. Unfortunately, reliance on sophisticated econometric 
techniques in pursuit of objectivity does not eliminate the need for a judgment call as to what 
factors represent objective needs as opposed to unfair historic patterns. This point is well 
articulated by Greene (2008, p. 156) in his thorough survey of the frontier estimation literature: 
Little is changed in the model by adding exogenous shifts, environmental variables, technical 
change, and so on to the production, cost, or distance functions …; however, it must be noted 
that there is a potential identification issue. The model is obviously indistinguishable from an 
otherwise “pure” model in which [these factors are part of the inefficiency component]. It is up 
to the model builder to resolve at the outset whether the exogenous factors are part of the 
technology heterogeneity or whether they are part of the inefficiency distribution. 
The efficiency frontier approach allows to model heterogeneity as shifts, as parameter 
variation (through an interactive term) in the cost function as well as shifts and heteroscedasticity 
of the distribution of the inefficiency term. Even if some of the observable characteristics can be 
deemed to belong to the inefficiency term rather than being objective cost factors, they should 
still be included in the estimation of the cost frontier. Not accounting for these “unjustified” 
patterns in historical spending will produce biased cost elasticities similar to the omission 
variable bias in linear regression models (Wang and Schmidt 2002). Thus, for example we need 
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to include the share of urban population to account for better availability of public services in 
cities. However, if we deem this historical pattern unjustified or unfair, we will not adjust cost 
norms for this factor and will only make adjustments for estimated elasitities of costs with 
respect to those factors that we deem objective. 
Table 7. Translog cost function for raion education expenditures, 2011 
Variable OLS Exponential Half-Normal 
Cost frontier variables 
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Note:  Robust standard errors are provided in parentheses: * statistically significant at 10 percent; ** 
statistically significant at 5 percent; *** statistically significant at 1 percent. All variables are in logs. 
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To illustrate the consequences of these methodological choices, we focus on raion 
expenditures in one sector: education. Here we can control for the service outcome level by using 
raion averages of standardized test scores for Math and the Russian language.
6
 First, we estimate 
a more flexible translog form of the cost function using OLS and two different versions of the 
efficiency frontier (exponential and half-normal). While initially we tried a full translog 
specification, in the final specification we only include those quadratic and interaction terms that 
were found statistically significant.  
In the translog specification, education costs have 65 percent elasticity with respect to 
school-age population (Table 7). At the same time a quadratic term for school-age population 
turned out statistically insignificant. This suggests a constant scale elasticity of costs of about 
0.65. Test scores do not appear to have a statistically significant relationship to education 
expenditures.  This is consistent with qualitative findings of the World Bank’s (2013) Public 
Expenditure Review. That report finds that higher costs are associated with fewer students per 
teacher (on average, less than ten students in rural areas); but that does not translate into better 
education outcomes.  The statistically significant coefficient on the interaction between the land 
area and the wage level suggests that land area affects the marginal cost with respect to wages as 
opposed to shifting the entire cost function. Thus, while in an average raion the elasticity of costs 
with respect to land area is only 0.0002, it is 0.3 in raions with the highest wages and -0.08 in 
raions with the lowest wages. Also, the statistically significant coefficient on the quadratic wage 
term, suggest a decreasing marginal cost with respect to wages. Thus, while in an average raion 
the elasticity of costs with respect to wages is 0.9, it is 1.14 in the raion with the lowest wages 
and -0.58 in the raion with the highest wages. 
Finally, to explain deviations from the efficiency frontier, we include two additional 
covariates. The 2005 number of schools captures underutilization of inherited infrastructure. As 
expected, this variable is associated with higher costs for the same values of other covariates, 
like school-age population. The share of locally derived revenues (own and shared at source) 
                                                 
6
 Belarus uses centralized entrance examination for admission to universities, which provides a consistent measure 
of student performance across schools. In 2006 MoE introduced a 100-point scale for evaluating the educational 
level, which is used for initial testing of all those entering institutions of higher education. This information helps 
evaluate the quality of secondary education. Prior to this, university entry examination varied significantly across 
universities and even within a university. 
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captures the reliance of local government on hard (non-negotiable) revenues and the link to their 
activities promoting local economic growth. This variable is associated with lower costs for the 
same values of other covariates. 
 Remarkably, the OLS estimates are quite close to those obtain through the frontier 
estimation modeling. The main difference concerns the impact of land area, which is within the 
10-percent significance level in the efficiency frontier models but has only 14 percent 
significance for the OLS estimates. 
Table 8. Cobb-Douglas cost function for raion education expenditures, 2011 
Variable OLS Exponential Half-Normal 
Cost frontier variables 
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Note:  Robust standard errors are provided in parentheses: * statistically significant at 10 percent; ** 
statistically significant at 5 percent; *** statistically significant at 1 percent. All variables are in logs. 
 
Table 8 suggest that a more consequential methodological choice concerns the functional 
form of the cost function (translog versus Cobb-Douglas) rather than allowing for one-sided 
efficiency deviations in the error term. Thus, under the Cobb-Douglas specification, land area 
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does not have any statistical significance while under the translog specification its impact is 
statistically significant but varies with the wage level.  
 
Conclusions 
Belarus has made good progress in recent years in reforming and updating its system of 
intergovernmental fiscal relations. However, as also identified in this paper, there are a number 
of areas that could benefit from further reform and allow Belarus to realize the gains in public 
sector efficiency that can be derived from a well-structured system of intergovernmental fiscal 
relations. 
Despite recent efforts to adopt a formula-based approach, the system of grants has continued 
to work in a discretionary manner, pretty much along the traditional lines of negotiating a “gap 
filling” transfer for each local government that closes the gap between a jurisdiction’s negotiated 
level of “expenditure needs” and its actual local revenues. This practice has continued to detract 
from the transparency and objectivity of the system of transfers. It should be emphasized that the 
problem does not necessarily lie in the amount of actual transfers, which appear to be quite 
effective in narrowing fiscal disparities, but rather in the manner in which these amounts are 
determined and adjusted.  Admittedly, the lack of adequate data, as well as macroeconomic and 
overall budget balance conditions may demand sporadic adjustments to the level of funding and 
the distribution formula. Nevertheless, the entire process of allocation—that is, the determination 
of the overall pool of funds and how the funds will be apportioned—should rest much more on 
transparent rules and objective data. In addition to the ad hoc determination of the amount of 
general purpose grants and the retention rates for national tax revenues, budget constraints are 
further softened by the practice of unplanned “other” transfers allocated in the course of the 
fiscal year by oblast governments to cities and raions. In 2011, these “other” recurrent transfers 
accounted for about 14 percent of all intergovernmental grants to both raions and sub-oblast 
cities.  
The Ministry of Finance has developed a formula-based methodology for the allocation of 
general-purpose grants that represents a great advance in terms of transparency and 
predictability. However, this new approach is yet to be implemented. Operationalizing this 
reform and extending a similar approach to the oblast-raion level should be a policy priority for 
the Ministry of Finance.  
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The methodology recently developed by the Ministry of Finance provides a sound template 
for regional systems of equalization transfers. To assist oblast governments in using the new 
formula for allocating grants to cities and raions, the Ministry of Finance could perform 
statistical estimations of elasticities of per client costs with respect to various cost factors on the 
sample pooling together cities and raions from all oblasts. In this paper, we discuss 
methodological aspects of such estimation in terms of the functional specification for the cost 
function and econometric treatment of deviations of historical expenditures from the “ideal” cost 
level. 
Performing estimations on a larger sample would ensure the accuracy of the estimates. The 
resulting estimates could be provided to the oblast governments as part of the budget circular 
along with other budget parameters serving as inputs to their budget planning process. 
Furthermore, in the calculations of adjustment coefficients for their cities and raions, oblast level 
officials might be more comfortable with applying the provided values of elasticities to the 
percentage differences in various factors rather than performing the actual estimation of 
elasticities.  The Ministry of Finance could also develop and make available to oblast 
governments a simple spreadsheet tool that would facilitate the application of the adopted 
methodology (or facilitate the evaluation of the proposed methodology at the stage of soliciting 
feedback from the stakeholders). 
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